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Dealing with Mass Violence 
in the Rift Valley of Kenya
Esibo S. Omaada PhD Fellow, Makerere Institute of Social Research
This policy brief is divided into three parts: research findings, policy anal-
ysis, and recommendations.
The Findings
These findings capture on one hand what people do with, in, and after 
violence, and on the other, the outcome of these as in what violence does 
to people, and as manifested in the people’s aspirations, striving, relations, 
status, and view of each other.
Becoming Kenya was marked by the colonial conquest and the resist-
ance that ensued; for instance, the Nandi resisted the British conquest from 
1890–1906, for more than 16 years. This resistance was done by individual 
social — political formations (nations, e.g. the Nandi nation) known today 
as tribes. At the level of the conquest, these nationalities became subdued 
(they lost land and their political organization was destroyed). This is the 
first level of becoming Kenya, thus at this level, Kenya was being sketched. 
The main tool for defining Kenya at this level was violence with a few dots 
of negotiations. When this research was done, the violence experienced at 
this level was not even in the remote consciousness of some Kenyans. Some 
scholars like Karuti Kanyinga only imply this violence in their attempt to 
rebuff the Nandi and other Kalenjin groupings against their re-ignited an-
imosity against the so called foreigners in the Rift Valley, the Kikuyu as it 
has been shown in the violence experiences in the 1990s and 2007/2008. 
Kanyinga’s point is that, neither the Nandi nor the Kikuyu can, historically 
speaking, claim Eldoret as their ancestral homeland because Eldoret and 
Uasin Gishu are Maasai names; therefore, the Maasai who were evicted and 
involuntarily resettled at Kilgoris were the ones that had inhabited Eldoret 
at the inception of Kenya. Kanyinga goes further to point out that other 
ethnic groupings in the Rift Valley like the Iteso, Gusii, and Abaluihya, who 
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were once the servants of the white settlers in the Right Valley, and conse-
quently benefited from the White Settler land when the settlers left Kenya 
at independence, are not victimized as foreigners. The question then is 
why are the Kikuyu considered as foreigners in the Rift Valley? Kanyinga’s 
response is that because the Kikuyu are the majority none-Kalenjin-owners 
of land for instance in Eldoret, and the blame should not be heaped on the 
Kikuyu, but on the independence government’s implementation strategy 
of Africanization policies, that favored the Kikuyu against other Kenyans 
in accessing the White settlers’ land. However, the post-independence gov-
ernments have remained aloof to this observation of Kanyinga in terms of 
policy responses. Instead, these governments’ policies have been reinstat-
ing the status quo. Consequently, this land-social-question has been left 
to politicians for soliciting support from the grass roots. As the findings of 
this research show, the contest now is between those who say, ‘you took our 
land’ against those who say, ‘we bought our land’. This debate boils down 
to the contest between ownership of land by one’s ancestral origin versus 
ownership of land by one’s residence. These seem to be the implications of 
the first level experiences of violence when Kenya was being sketched with 
the pen of violence that created land inequality that has persisted to date. 
As such, Kenya has become a land of landless and large owners of tracts of 
land, as well as the land where ethnicity is employed not just as a weapon 
for fighting this social injustice, but also as an instrument for defending the 
social injustice. Nonetheless, the solution to this problem seems to lie in 
delinking land ownership from ethnic identity. This is the responsibility of 
governance and the government mediated by the intellectual imagination. 
It should be noted that creating opportunities that remove people’s attach-
ment to land on one hand and on the other boldly addressing the land 
injustices are not to be taken as substitutes, but complementary moves, and 
these moves need to be implemented concurrently.
At the second level of becoming Kenya, elites as products of coloni-
alism emerged and started demanding for recognition in terms of equal 
rights with the colonialists and creation of autonomous spaces because 
they already had the education and culture of the colonialists. However, 
the Colonial government vehemently resisted the attempts of this elites. 
Consequently, these elites first started creating the ethnic identities. For 
example, Kenyatta and Odinga give us a picture of how they were becoming 
first Kikuyu (Kikuyu nationalism) and Luo (Luo Nationalism) respective-
ly, then due to the weaknesses of these identities when considered inde-
pendently at forcing the colonial government to grant them their demands, 
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these elites that were riding on these identities started reaching at other 
groups, consequently broadening their scope. In doing this, a sense of Ken-
ya from the colonized perspective was emerging against the Kenya of the 
colonizers. However, these elites that emerged in the colonial period have 
persisted to date and they have taken communities hostage in their politics. 
These elites since their emergence during the colonial period have been 
patronizing their communities. The solution to this problem seems to lie in 
the institution of party democracy. Just like the previous observation, this 
also is a governance issue, whose responsibility lies with the government.
However, in reaction to the emerging broad resistance organized by 
the collaborating elites from all corners of the country, the colonial gov-
ernment took drastic measures of, for instance, involuntarily repatriating 
the Kikuyu who had earlier been dispossessed of their land from their an-
cestral home of central Kenya, and had been brought to work in the white 
highlands in the Rift Valley, back to central Kenya. David Anderson says 
that, “more than 100,000 Kikuyu squatters were forcibly ‘repatriated’” from 
the Rift Valley between 1946 and 1952 to Central Kenya. This was a big 
mistake from the colonial government because they left this Kikuyu with 
no alternative other than taking arms to fight for a home. This marked the 
emergence of Mau Mau rebellion, which employed the available cultur-
al technology of oath taking as a tool of conscripting everyone from the 
community into the resistance in order to ensure loyalty to the resistance 
by keeping the tenets of the resistance secret. At this level, the former dis-
parate identity groups that had been crushed by the colonial conquering 
machinery, had now become desperate resisters of this machinery. The 
spirit of Mau Mau nor the oath taking did not die with the achievement 
of independence. It has persisted to date as it was experienced in the pre - 
2007/2008 violence experiences and with the transformation of Mau Mau 
to Mungiki. From this, it is clear that Kenyans have become desperate re-
sisters of instances of injustice by falling back to the previous strategies 
that had worked. This seems to imply that these strategies have never been 
transformed and the course for these strategies has never been addressed 
completely. As it emerged in this research that there are still squatters in 
some farms in the Rift Valley, and whenever the owners of these farms 
want to sell them or have sold them, the squatters are put into big trouble 
of finding the last resort to fall back to. On the part of the current govern-
ment, the solution does not lie in sub-dividing land to squatters but open-
ing new avenues for livelihoods such as giving the youth micro-finance 
loans to start businesses. However, the question is, what if the business 
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fails, where do the squatter youth fall back to? By the way, these strate-
gies are not targeting squatter youth specifically but all the youth in Kenya. 
This still leaves the gap between youths that hope in inheriting land from 
their parents, and youth that hope in inheriting the squatter-status in case 
everything else fails to help them graduate from squatter-hood to Kenyans 
that own land. At the social question level, Kenyans have become ‘those 
that inherit and own land’ and ‘those without land to inherit, but can work 
very had to buy and own land or remain with the squatters status’. The 
‘working hard’ culture is part of this becoming. As mentioned earlier, the 
current government’s move to creating alternative livelihood opportunities 
is welcome, but it should be treated as complementary to addressing the 
land question.
At the third level of becoming Kenya, towards independence, Ken-
yans were being introduced into party politics, but these parties were not 
different from the previous ethnic socializations. For instance, the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) was a party of the mega identity groups, 
the Kikuyu and the Luo. This alliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo 
sent a chilling message to the minority social and political formations like 
the Maasai, Kamba, and the then splinter groupings of the current Kalen-
jin. Consequently, the minority groups started their own political arrange-
ment, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was the result. The major 
concerns for KADU were land and representation. The elites of the minor-
ities like Moi (for the Kalenjin), John Keen (for the Maasai) were afraid 
that if the giant social and political formations that had allied under KANU 
take the government from the colonialists, their people were at risk of los-
ing their land and being under represented. This marked the emergence 
of Majimbo politics (regional politics), which basically stated that the re-
sources like land belong to only the people that hail from that region. The 
independence constitution captured this arrangement. However, after in-
dependence, this was abrogated, and the question of land access was left 
to the market values, willing seller, and willing buyer basis. This was a pos-
itive step to becoming and owning Kenya, however, it was limited to only 
those with the capacity to buy land. In addition, there was no transparency 
in letting out the information about the availability of White Highlands 
for sale to the locals. Even this idea of opening land for sale, while being 
conscious of the economic and social status of the majority of the citizens 
was a wrong move from the government. As such, land as a social question 
was not addressed fully, and it has remained unaddressed to date. Conse-
quently, it has become a national question because most of the ethnically 
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instigated violence is linked to it at a national level. The contest of status by 
origin versus status by residence is always re-enacted when there is a major 
inter-ethnic clash. The solution to this problem seems to lie in addressing 
the land question.
At the fourth level of becoming Kenya, there has been a move away 
from the social question and a focus on the political question, which start-
ed with the one party system in the 1960s up to 2002, and this party was 
KANU — Kenya African National Union. Attempts in the late sixties to re-kin-
dle the independence spirit of multi-party politics were thwarted with vio-
lent crackdown and imprisonment of instigators of multiparty politics. In 
1982, after the failed coup attempt, the multiparty spirit was ‘laid to rest’ 
when Kenya transformed from de-facto to de-jure one party system. This, 
officially, thwarted the attention to address the social land question, and 
this attention was re-directed to addressing the political question. This ef-
fort bore fruit in the early 1990s when Kenya embraced multiparty politics, 
but this was costly. The cost was the instigated ethnic violence by the in-
cumbent president, Moi, who was scared of loosing power in the multi-par-
ty contest. The strategy that the then government employed was to make 
the pockets of opposition in the Rift Valley unsettled. These pockets of the 
opposition in the Rift Valley happened to be also places that were inhab-
ited by non-Kalenjin — places like Molo that were and are still pre-domi-
nantly inhabited by Kikuyu. In addition, places like Kericho that have large 
tracts of tea plantations were highly destabilized because in such places, 
there are many non-Kalenjin working there. The assumption of this politics 
of destabilization by making the targeted unsettled was that non-Kalenjin 
were pro-opposition, and Kalenjin were pro-the incumbent’s party, KANU. 
Therefore, by making the non-Kalenjin unsettled, it meant that they could 
not vote, and as such, the incumbent was sure of a landslide victory in these 
areas. This worked out for the incumbent, and since then, this politics kept 
on being appealed to during the general and by elections. This politics has 
made Kenyans become apprehensive of each other, ‘those whose leaders 
are in government’ against ‘those whose leaders are in opposition’. How-
ever, after the elections, the situation gradually normalizes without much 
effort from the government, implying that the violence was just employed 
for a short-term end: winning elections. In addition, the Kenyan political 
terrain has also become a terrain of politics of coalitions based on ethnic 
identities. Together with this is the politics of big men, who lead specif-
ic parties and have kept their ethnic groups hostage in this parties, and 
this tendency has persisted since independence. As mentioned earlier, the 
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solution to this problem seems to lie in the democratization of political 
parties.
At the fifth level, there have been very interesting developments in 
the early 1990s violence and the 2007/2008 violence. During the early 
1990s violence, the displaced persons started advocating for their course, 
letting the world know their situation. This arrangement was successful 
to an extent that this organization remained intact without disintegrating 
even when the violence had dissipated. However, to justify its existence, it 
transformed itself into an NGO. For survival tactics, it moved its headquar-
ters to Nairobi. This, in my view is interesting in that, out of violence, the 
people from the grass roots are beginning mechanisms that are somewhat 
sustainable in soliciting resources from within and abroad to fight against 
violent tendencies. One of the implications of this is that from violence, 
something positive can emerge.
In this line of thinking, during the 2007/2008 violence, there was an-
other grass roots initiate. In this initiative, the grass roots people from the 
antagonistic identity groupings reached out to the other in order to make 
peace. This move was the beginning of what is today called the peace com-
mittees. Later, when the government saw the success of this initiative, they 
were structured from grass roots to national level. This research found out 
that it was the efforts of these committees that delivered the peaceful 2013 
general elections. Nonetheless, this level of national conscious is quite dif-
ferent from the pre-independence level of national consciousness. While 
in pre-independent Kenya, leaders from ethnic groupings reached out for 
leaders from other ethnic groupings to solicit synergies to fight against co-
lonialism, in 2007/2008 - violence, ordinary Kenyans from different ethnic 
ascriptions reached out for the perceived adversaries for purposes of mak-
ing peace.
A part from these grass roots initiatives, civil society especially the 
Church and NGOs have been active in giving relief to the displaced per-
sons during the violence. However, the difference between CSOs and the 
grass root initiatives is that a spirit of defying moves of the perpetrators of 
violence is being formed among the grass root people, who normally bare 
the brunt of this violence. For me, this is a sign of hope for what Kenya is 
becoming: people are beginning to define their future directly, which is 
creating a tension between direct participation and representation. With 
this humble initiative, if this spirit is not hampered, which I think it has 
already been when the government incorporated this move into its minis-
tries, the chronic social problem linked to land in Kenya may be addressed.
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Analysis of Relevant Policies
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya in a way reflects the independence debates 
of the majority-minority representation, and the devolved government 
question. However, it is different from the early 1960s debates in that it 
does not tie ownership of land to one’s ancestral origin. As such it is pro-
gressive in that it has provided an institution, the senate, to protect the 
devolved governments. It has also given provisions to rectify the historic 
injustices through addressing regional disparities and marginalization, the 
land question, and the national cohesion question among others. This con-
stitution is raising the hopes of Kenyans, and at the same time, it is tying 
Kenyans to their devolved governments — in a way, it is reifying the ethnic 
identities because the boundaries of most of the devolved governments co-
incide with the ethnic boundaries.
On the land question, the 2010 Constitution has created the Nation-
al Land Commission to implement the land policy that seeks to address 
restitution issues, compensation issues, and addressing historic injustices. 
At the devolved governments level, the Constitution provides for the es-
tablishment of the County Land Commission, which is one of the dockets 
under the office of the County Governor. However, when this research was 
done, these commissions at the County level had not been established. 
Therefore, the two departments, that is, the land and survey departments 
that are supposed to be operationalized at these County level Commissions 
were none existent, mainly because parliament had not allocated enough 
funds to the National Land Commission.
Another observation is that, when this research was conducted, there 
was a fight between the Chairman of the National Land Commission and 
the Minister of Lands over signing of the land titles, and over supremacy. 
According to the 2010 Constitution the two institutions are autonomous, 
however they are supposed to cooperate in resolving the land question. 
This fight coupled with the insufficient funds allocated to the commission 
have kept the attempts to address the land question in abeyance.
Another observation is that, most of the 1909–2019 land leases of mul-
tinational companies that own plantations of cash crops like tea are expir-
ing, and yet the institutions that are supposed to process these documents 
are not yet in existence. Nonetheless, something new is brewing from the 
ground: some Counties like Kericho are thinking of not renewing these 
leases. Instead, they want to revert the land to the County and divide it 
among the citizens that belong to the County.
It also emerged during the research that there have been attempts 
MISR WP 27 Esibo.indd   8 15/10/2015   09:17
WHAT IS KENYA BECOMING: DEALING WITH MASS VIOLENCE IN THE RIFT VALLEY OF KENYA 9
to address the plight of the displaced people. In the beginning of these 
attempts, the displaced persons were given a small piece of land and ten 
thousand Kenyan shillings (Kshs. 10,000) to start off a new life. However, 
there were complaints from the resettled persons that they were being re-
settled in dry places like Naivasha. In response the government decided to 
resettle the displaced monetarily. Thus, four hundred thousand shillings 
(Kshs. 400,000) was given by government to displaced persons and they 
were left on-their-on to look for land for themselves. However, there was 
another complaint that the government was only compensating people 
whom the government had evicted from the forests and those that had 
land. As such, those who were squatting have not been compensated.
The other Commission that I would like to comment about is the Na-
tional Cohesion and Integration Commission, which is enabled by the Na-
tional Cohesion and Integration Act of 2008. This Commission’s mandate 
as outlined in the Act is “to encourage national cohesion and integration 
by outlawing discrimination on ethnic grounds.” One of the ways that this 
Commission seeks to encourage cohesion and integration is through en-
suring that “all public establishment shall seek to represent the diversity of 
the people of Kenya in the employment of staff.” However, in practice, this 
seems far from reality. In addition, the current government seems to inter-
pret this provision to mean that there are some positions meant for specific 
ethnic groupings. For instance the former Inspector General of Police (IGP) 
was from the Marakwet community, and when he resigned the president 
appointed the current IGP from the same community.
Some of the provisions of this Act (2008) are difficult to implement. 
For instance, this provision: “No public establishment shall have more than 
one third of its staff from the same ethnic community.”1 The question is, 
what of counties that have one ethnic group, where will they go to search 
for this ethnic equation in order to get the required service providers? 
However, this makes sense in multi-ethnic places.
Nonetheless, this Commission seems to be inspired by the view that 
ethnicity in itself is harmless; it is only when resources are associated with 
it that it becomes harmful.
It is my view that this commission will make a lot of sense to Kenyans 
if it embraces the emerging national and social questions and takes them 
head-on rather than just focusing in naming and shaming of corrupt gov-
ernment officials.
1 Ibid. pp. 10.
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Policy Recommendations
The question of democratizing political parties needs to be addressed ur-
gently. The government needs to come up with bold moves to bring san-
ity to the democratization process of political parties. For instance, there 
should be only two term limits for any Kenyan to attempt to become a 
president and to be a leader of a political party.
There is need for the government to address the land question in or-
der to reduce bases that reify ethnic identities and violence. The govern-
ment should take the available opportunities like the expiring land leases; 
the problem of squatters, and the perpetual election violence displace-
ments to pursued the minority Kenyans owning large tracts of land to join 
the government in addressing the land question.
There is need for the government to build institutions that nurture 
the direct participation in governance of the country by grass roots Ken-
yans. Inline with this, the peace committees should be delinked from 
the government ministries because they have been reduced to the role of 
government early warning system informers whereby the power to make 
decisions has been taken away from them. The spirit that brought these 
committees into existence should be allowed to thrive by making these 
committees autonomous from the government organs.
The National Cohesion and Integration Commission should be em-
powered to collaborate with other commissions in addressing national 
questions.
The government needs to strengthen county governments financially 
by having a 45:55 ratio division of the revenue between the devolved gov-
ernments and the central government.
I conclude by saying the daily political and social processes determine 
what Kenya and Kenyans are becoming; and this becoming started with 
the colonial conquest and the resistance to this conquest. These processes 
have shaped the form of national consciousness of Kenyans. The social is-
sues like land, employment opportunities and the nature of national poli-
tics mediate this consciousness. However, there have been persistent social 
and political issues that the government needs to take a decisive position 
in order to improve the quality of this national consciousness. Specifically, 
the government needs to address the persistent land question that seems 
to influence the ethnic and political dynamics in Kenya, and address the 
distribution of resources question between the central government and the 
devolved governments, and put in place strict laws to guide political parties 
to become democratic so that Kenya becomes a Kenya for all Kenyans not 
just by name but also in ownership, responsibility and accountability.
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